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The range of genetic conditions and fetal anomalies detectable before 
or in early pregnancy is enlarging continuously, making pregnancy 
a minefield of complex ethical problems. Prenatal genetic and ano­
maly counselling and testing are now part of routine antenatal care. 
The main goals of this service are to provide counselling before 
proceeding with pregnancy or to identify affected fetuses in order to 
inform and offer parents choices on whether to continue with certain 
pregnancies, but several dangers arise. Pregnancy becomes tentative 
and provisional, instead of an unconditional acceptance as a ‘gift of 
God’.[1] Women are encouraged to expect a ‘perfect baby’, disability 
is medicalised and screening technologies endorse discrimination 
against those who live meaningful lives with the very impairments 
that are tested for. The following challenging case was managed in the 
Obstetric Special Care division at Tygerberg Academic Hospital, Cape 
Town. This patient granted full informed consent for a case discussion.
Presenting problem
Mrs X was 22 years old with non­lethal osteogenesis imperfecta (OI), 
a congenital, genetic condition that had caused her short stature and 
severe scoliosis. She presented at 24 weeks 2 days gestation during 
her second pregnancy after moving to South Africa (SA) from England. 
This pregnancy was desired and welcome. Her first pregnancy was 
terminated early on request. OI is an inheri ted (autosomal dominant 
– 50% chance), severely debilitating condition with brittle bones 
that fracture easily. Fractures start during intra­uterine life and 
the baby is born with deformities. Scoliosis com promises mobility 
and complicates childbirth. Mrs X had multiple previous fractures, 
including bilateral femur, and a pelvic fracture. She had undergone 
several operations to stabilise these fractures. Her short stature, 
scoliosis and deformities caused a constant, moderate dyspnoea. By 
religious conviction she was a Jehovah’s Witness (JW), who did not 
smoke or drink alcohol. Prior to the pregnancy she was completely 
self­sufficient.
Course of pregnancy
Apart from her skeletal problems, other organ functions were normal. 
Detailed ultrasound examination of her fetus revealed characteristic 
OI fractures in different stages of healing. Importantly, there were 
no rib fractures and the chest was normal. Mrs X’s baseline function 
started changing at 22 weeks’ gestation, with painful legs and back, 
difficulty walking and sleeping. At 28 weeks she required a wheelchair 
for daily activities. Because vaginal delivery was not deemed possible, 
an elective caesarean section was planned at 37 weeks while care­
ful monitoring continued. The possibility of blood transfusion was 
sensitively discussed due to her JW faith. She was comfortable with 
this, provided that it was regarded as life saving and that there were 
no alternatives.
At 35 weeks 2 days Mrs X was readmitted with significantly 
deteriorating respiratory function and was delivered by caesarean 
section 1 day later. Special precautions were taken during the 
anaesthetic and surgery, and a male baby (2 480 g) was born in good 
condition. Mrs X declined the offer of sterilisation but opted for an 
intra­uterine contraceptive device, which was inserted during surgery. 
Following the delivery she was admitted to a critical care unit for 
observation, but recovered quickly without complications or a blood 
transfusion. She and her baby were discharged 6 days after delivery. 
This case clearly touches many issues but we will focus on reproductive 
autonomy (RA).
Reproductive autonomy
Reproductive autonomy represents the strong interest or right to 
make choices regarding reproduction even when others might 
regard such choices as unwise or against public interest. Dworkin, 
a philosopher and legal theorist, describes the RA of persons as ‘a 
right to control their own role in procreation unless the state has a 
compelling reason for denying them that control’.[2] In modern life, 
genetic information is increasingly available and society is ‘policed’ by 
advocates of responsible motherhood.[3] Therefore it could be argued 
that society may become increasingly critical of those who, in its 
opinion, make the wrong reproductive decisions although this does 
not in itself make the decisions immoral. 
Freedom to procreate
Why do individuals value having genetically related children, through 
natural procreation, so highly? Strong argues that such children affirm 
a couple’s love and provide a link to future persons, but he rejects the 
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notion that men must prove their virility and women their femininity 
through children.[4] Most women experience pregnancy and the joy 
of childbirth as deeply meaningful and valuable. Pregnant women are 
esteemed by the community and pregnancy provides an experience 
of personal development and altruism.[4] While genetic links do not 
guarantee superior social relationships the reasons above do justify 
the desire for genetic offspring, with procreation contributing to self­
fulfilment and self­identity. Therefore, interference with these rights 
may deny necessary respect due to individuals. Although freedom to 
procreate may be outweighed by other ethical concerns we would 
require compelling reasons to override it. Next we examine the other 
end of the spectrum.
Freedom not to procreate
Several arguments support the value of this seemingly counter­
intuitive freedom. This ‘negative’ freedom helps a person direct 
the course of her or his life. Persons may prefer not to procreate 
because they are not located within socially acceptable parenting 
relationships. Having children places major demands on parents’ 
time and resources. Autonomy and self­determination are enhanced 
by the freedom to decide whether or when to have children. Many 
women of reproductive age suffer from diseases such as diabetes, 
hypertension or renal impairment. When a pregnancy would signi­
ficantly threaten the existing health, or even life of a woman, her 
freedom not to procreate protects the course of her life. Sadly, women 
are often coerced by the expectations of partners and society to risk 
their future health. Freedom not to procreate is closely linked to 
bodily self­determination. Women have the right to decide on the use 
of contraceptives and especially sterilisation. Although men also have 
this right, it is especially important for women due to their previous 
‘oppression’ and the fact that they bear the burdens of pregnancy.
Many feminist authors postulate that male­stream moral theory 
has both feminised and looked down upon the role of care and 
relationship in moral decision­making. Gilligan contrasts ‘care ethics’ 
with what she calls ‘justice or rights ethics’ and sees them as loosely 
feminine and masculine, respectively.[5] Kroeger­Mappes[6] argues 
that a system of two ethics, with rights presiding over care ethics, 
is seriously flawed, as women but not men are held accountable to 
both kinds of ethics. Women are held to the requirements of care 
ethics, especially in home and family life, in ways that men are not. 
This subordinates women by viewing caring activities as obligatory 
for women and as supererogatory for most men. Therefore for women 
to gain equality, they must be free to regulate their reproductive lives 
on the basis of liberal, individual rights.  
When is it morally wrong to procreate?
‘The idea that it might be a moral crime to have a baby, that it might 
be wrong to bring a new human individual into the world is to many 
people simply bizarre. It is only having an abortion and perhaps 
also refraining from having children that is regarded as requiring 
justification’.[7]
At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether a child 
could be better off if he or she had never been born, known in legal 
terms as ‘wrongful life’. Ultimately, the difference is not about being 
born impaired rather than unimpaired but ‘the difference between 
being born and not being born – existing and not existing’.[8] When 
there is an early indication (before viability) that an impaired child will 
be born, is it morally right or wrong to bring that child to birth? Surely, 
once all interested parties (parents, the potential child, family and 
society) have received due consideration, it is not wrong to proceed 
responsibly. Our answer also depends on the value that we place on 
life and our concept of a worthwhile life. If we generally regard life as 
valuable and positive then ‘unless the child’s condition is predicted to 
be so bad that it would not have a worthwhile life, it will always be 
in the child’s interests to be brought into being’[8] as this is this child’s 
only chance of existing at all. We are aware of the book by Benatar[9] 
in which he argues that it is always worse to come into existence 
than to never have come into existence. We disagree with this view. 
Comparing existence with non­existence is problematic. If a person 
was never born, never existed, then it is illogical to argue that they 
could be better or worse off. On the other hand, it seems reasonable 
to consider lives that are worth living and ‘those that are so blighted 
by suffering that they may be considered “unworthwhile’’.’[8] Utili­
ta rians could argue that it would be cruel to bring such lives into 
exis tence, thereby increasing unhappiness, but how would society 
prevent this without invading individual privacy, bodily integrity and 
civil liberties?
While Feinberg[10] has suggested that it is morally wrong to bear 
children who will be born with physical or mental impairment even 
if their lives are expected to be worthwhile, Bennett and Harris[8] ask 
‘what if anything is morally wrong about bringing into existence 
an impaired but worthwhile life?’ However, there is a point where 
Bennett and Harris’s opinions diverge. Both defend RA as a ‘powerful 
interest’ even ‘where these choices may be thought unwise, frivolous 
or contrary to the public interest’. Both agree that as long as a life is 
worthwhile, i.e. valued by the person whose life it is, it is equal to any 
other life regardless of its quality. This applies to all actual lives but 
Bennett extends it to all possible lives. They agree that only a life of 
overwhelming suffering has a different value.[8] Very few disabilities 
reach this ‘standard of awfulness’. When someone can only have an 
impaired or disabled child, it is not morally wrong to do so if it can be 
judged that the life would be worthwhile. Harris has even stated that 
‘for those who can only have disabled children, having such children 
may be morally better than having no children at all’.[11]
The important point at which the opinions of Bennett and Harris [8] 
diverge is when parents have the alternative of bearing children who 
will not be affected by disabilities. Harris argues that if such parents 
choose to continue with a pregnancy where a disabled child will be 
born, they needlessly make the world worse by adding suffering. 
Here ‘we are not comparing a child’s life with or without disability but 
rather the lives of different possible children’. The wrong lies not in the 
creation of the life of the child, if it is judged to have a worthwhile life, 
but in adding avoidable suffering or unhappiness to the world. In this 
consequentialist argument moral reasons may trump reproductive 
autonomy. Although we clearly have a strong moral obligation 
to minimise net suffering, certain disabilities are trivial, and the 
assumption that the lives of disabled persons contain more suffering 
than the lives of able­bodied individuals is far from self­evident. If the 
lives of disabled and able­bodied persons are valued by those who 
love them they have equal value, even if they have different qualities. 
This is true in an existential sense and each person has a powerful 
interest in making his or her life as good as possible.
Bennett on the other hand, believes that these choices are 
‘genuinely morally indifferent’. Even if parents can potentially bear 
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normal children as well, in the choice of bringing a disabled child 
to birth no one is harmed. ‘Those who choose to bring a disabled 
child to birth are responsible for that decision. If the mother had dis­
abled her “healthy child” by her deliberate actions, then she would 
be responsible for the harm incurred. However, in the case of a 
congenital malformation, neither has the child been harmed, nor is 
the mother morally responsible for that harm by bringing the child 
to birth. The child has not been harmed as … these opportunities 
were never available to him.’[8] The child gains existence and although 
society may prefer normal children, the parents should not be 
condemned for their choice.[8]  
Is there a societal duty not to procreate?
We now extend the ‘morally wrong to procreate’ argument by briefly 
discussing the opinions of McHale,[3] a British medical lawyer on whe­
ther a duty not to reproduce exists. There is increasing pressure in 
modern society to give birth to the best possible children.[12] This pres­
surises women to behave responsibly and make correct reproductive 
choices, but how far does this argument extend down the slippery 
slope? Is it limited to choosing to avert significant handicap or does 
it extend to intelligence and desirable morphologic characteristics? 
Such language stirs discomfort as it reminds us of eugenics debates. 
Assisted reproductive technologies already provide a means of 
controlling access to reproductive services where clinicians select 
participants according to pre­determined criteria. However, such 
control does not apply outside the walls of infertility clinics and a 
general application would at present seem ‘ludicrous’.[3]  
There may be a duty not to procreate if certain harm to the 
child can be demonstrated. A couple at very high risk for passing 
on an incurable disorder might want genetically related offspring. 
The emotionally taxing, limited and very expensive option of pre­
implantation diagnosis is sometimes available but couples might 
object to the destruction of unused embryos. Would it be morally 
and legally wrong for them to reproduce without such screening? 
Although admitting the difficulty of defining a ‘minimally satisfying 
life’, Purdy[13] has strongly argued that it is wrong to reproduce when 
a high chance of transmitting genetic disease, such as Huntington’s 
disease, exists. One may speculate that with the amount of potential 
genetic information increasing at a rapid pace, even normal couples 
might feel ‘forced’ to undergo genetic testing before they reproduce. 
Therefore further pressure will be placed on making reproductive 
decisions acceptable to society, as the ‘slippery slope’ of eugenics 
looms large. Greater knowledge of a person’s genetic status might also 
have other consequences, e.g. affecting employment or insurance. 
Even if a duty not to procreate existed, how would it be enforced? 
Population­based, compulsory testing would be necessary, many 
fundamental rights would be violated and a law would be impossible 
to apply consistently (e.g. unplanned pregnancies). McHale[3] also 
notes that successful ‘wrongful life’ claims will impose intolerable 
burdens on the medical profession and encourage pressure to advise 
abortion in doubtful cases through fear of litigation.
We may ask who should bear the costs of caring for affected 
children. For indigent parents the cost may have to be carried by 
the state but does this equate to imposing a duty not to procreate? 
There is concern about modern society’s attitude towards disabled 
community members. We agree with the view that screening for 
disabilities in order to prevent them or applying modern technology 
to lessen the burdens of disability conveys an attitude of intolerance 
for, or non­acceptance of, disabled people, but to try and prevent 
disabilities does not necessarily imply rejection of disabled people.[14]
The FIGO position
The recent Federation of International Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
(FIGO)[15] committee report titled ‘Ethical issues in the management of 
severe congenital anomalies’ emphasises that anomalies range from 
insignificant to severe, with the latter resulting in death or significant 
mental or physical disability. The lack of a medical definition of both 
severity of fetal disease and normal life is acknowledged but the very 
notion of normal is often regarded by disabled persons as a form of 
discrimination. Because delivering and raising a severely impaired 
baby may impact the physical, mental and social life of a family, FIGO 
recommends that women should be informed about the risks and 
benefits of fetal diagnostic testing regardless of the legal availability 
of termination of pregnancy. When a severe anomaly is present the 
woman has the right to discuss and access termination of pregnancy, 
but that decision as well as the responsibility for its consequences 
should always rest with her. Despite this strong support of parental 
autonomy the report states unequivocally that it is unethical to 
terminate a pregnancy on the grounds of fetal sex alone, with the 
exception of severe sex­linked, genetic disorders.[15]
Selective procreation
Our generation has at its disposal greater knowledge regarding 
genetics, assisted reproduction and the diagnosis of fetal anomalies 
than ever before. This knowledge generates choices, but having 
more choices does not necessarily make them better.[16] Savulescu’s[12] 
principle of procreative beneficence (PB) states that we have a 
moral duty to select the best children possible. This makes intuitive 
sense within the original context (in vitro fertilisation) and when, 
e.g. a diabetic woman postpones pregnancy while optimising her 
glycaemic control to avoid fetal congenital anomalies, but PB still 
remains controversial.[17] Although it is clear that giving birth to a 
disabled child does not harm that particular child, utilitarians would 
argue that life quality and costs must be considered, but among the 
variability of human life, happiness is a complex matter that escapes 
simple calculation and PB discounts the significance of relationships. 
Contemporary liberal societies promote the idea of social inclusion of 
disabled persons, claiming that they can be as happy and productive 
as able­bodied ones.[18]
In defending selection, consideration could be given to the 
interests of future persons in terms of inter­generational justice 
expounded in Parfit’s[19] Non­Identity Problem. However, egalitarian 
principles do not indicate how reasonable parents should ‘select’ 
their children, as disabilities may correctly be viewed as natural facts 
(misfortune) rather than injustices. According to Tong:[20] ‘Disability 
is not a good in itself. Rather it is something with which all 
human beings, to a greater or lesser degree, must cope, so that 
they can discover or shape meaning for themselves within its 
limitations. Children’s genes are not their entire destiny’.  A rights­
based approach must assume equality and impartiality, which could 
not justify choosing one life over another. It seems too easy to move 
from the bad eugenics of the past to present good genomics, but 
parents have no moral duty to deny less than normal fetuses the 
prospect of a meaningful life.[20] History leaves ample evidence of 
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severely disabled people who made admirable contributions to 
society, e.g. Hellen Keller (1880 ­ 1968) who, though deaf, blind and 
mute as a child, attained university degrees and wrote books, as well 
as Henri de Toulouse Lautrec (1864 ­ 1901), a dwarf who was also a 
famous French painter.
In his examination of selecting healthy children, Jacobs[21] rejects 
both the ‘conservative position of procreative autonomy’ and the 
‘radical position’ of PB by opting for a middle path that is informed by 
the ‘moral calculus’ of the expected quality of life for any individual 
child. In this case study our patient had performed that moral 
calculation. She was fully aware of the spectrum of her disease and 
had an optimistic, yet realistic personal perspective. From a utili tarian 
perspective she had robust grounds on which to base her conviction 
that her life as a parent and the life of her child would be worthwhile. 
It is a difficult exercise to draw an objective, impassionate line of 
severity that identifies lives that should not be brought into being. 
However, when selective procreation does offer the opportunity 
to prevent significant suffering, it is our responsibility to consider 
it carefully when dealing with impairments regarded as severe. 
Ultimately we do well to heed the reminder that irrespective of our 
differences, humans have moral worth and that although our true 
identity should be inwardly generated rather than socially derived, 
the recognition of our lives by significant others, shapes our image 
and self­esteem.[18] We may not reduce our fellow persons to their 
genetic characteristics or bodily capacities. This full recognition of 
human dignity in open, vulnerable love, expressed in the parent­
child and other relationships, argues against the general selection 
of children.
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